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Risk/Utility Analysis
Stuart Madden
PROFESSOR MADDEN: I have long imagined that Tort Law, as a presentation of
liability rules, presents our culture's optimal image of itself. It is better in terms of safety,
innovation, justice, and encouragement of beneficial conduct. Consistent with this in my
view, the reporters have set out the central principles justifying negligence law. The
general principles, as you see in Section 3 of your handout, indicate that you will be
responsible for such negligent conduct as causes harm. Section 4 describes for us the type
of factors that will be employed in determining whether or not an individual has acted
with reasonable care under the circumstances. A balancing evaluation takes into account
the foreseeability and the likelihood of a harmhl result, the foreseeable severity of the
harm, and the burden on the actor and others if the actor takes actions to eliminate or
reduce the possibility of harm. Our burden of precautionary measures must be related to
the provability of harm times the magnitude of the loss, should it occur. The ultimate
evaluation of that final safety measure has been aptly described by David Owen as the
microbalancing that we take into account in making that last decision.' That penultimate
decision might be, for example, I am hungry and it is lunchtime. The ultimate decision
might consider whether I dare eat at the school cafeteria. The penultimate decision might
be that I need to clean up the pizza encrusted waxed paper from my pizzeria, and do I
have to do it more than once every half hour; the ultimate microbalancing question is
what do I gain in terms of enhanced safety for the information costs and the increased
labor associated with keeping my pizzeria floor under continuous surveillance. I think
that most of us would agree that continual surveillance is probably fairly costly.
The reporters used the example of the microbalancing that goes on when you are
responsible for ensuring that the trees along your immense wooded estate do not fall onto
adjoining highways. You have some kind of duty of surveillance. Whether that becomes
a once every three month duty of surveillance or a monthly duty of surveillance is
determined by the microbalancing that weighs the cost of that added precautionary
measure against whatever enhanced safety (if one can be identified), you achieve.
The same evaluation applies for contributory negligence as well as for ordinary
negligence, according to the reporters. Nevertheless, in evaluating the reasonable care
standard in contributory negligence, factors that we will take into account in a more
particularized way will be the number of
persons exposed and the severity of the harm
~houldit occur. For example, if you have a
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with the use of a ladder, what you are talking
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about, characteristically, is the risk of injury to the individual ladder user. But if you have
negligence that will cause harm or create harm to others, such as what we would associate
with drunk driving, the evaluation will be applied more severely in terms of comparative
fault, in the event that there is a vehicular accident.
One of the things that the reporters do most marvelously in this restatement is to
clarify for us what really constitutes cost benefit analysis and what constitutes risk utility
analysis. The cost benefit analysis assumes that you are going to move proactively to
reduce the risk, the number of persons who will be exposed to the risk, or the likelihood
of harm. The cost of the precautions taken is the road traveled and what do you get in
exchange for that cost? What benefits are derived from that expenditure of the cost? The
cost can be more than just financial expenditure. It can be a variety of things.
Risk utility is the road not taken. If people continue to go out in seagoing tugs
without two way radio we evaluate the risk if the conduct is not changed against the
utility of continuation of the conduct. I suppose that the only virtue of continuation of the
conduct, other than maybe saving $40, was perhaps the hedonic "ignorance is bliss"
pleasure that the tug owners might have enjoyed at that point. So, for me, and I think for
many of you, the distinction between cost benefit analysis and risk utility analysis is
valuable. You can see that cost benefit analysis and risk utility analysis are really two
sides of the same coin, and the risk utility analysis has been identified by Posner as sort
This theory is that a reasonable profit seeking actor will
of a crude economic e~aluation.~
invest in safety precautions up to, but not beyond, the point which they derive certain
benefits in terms of safety, or up to but not beyond which point they actually get some
alleviation in terms of liability cost.
Now the balancing approach which, as the authors point out, take into account the
probability of the harm and the magnitude of the law should it occur. We have run into
this a lot in products liability. For example, if there is a one in a million chance of
paralysis we will have a duty to warn, but if there is a one in a thousand chance of a mild
under arm irritation from aluminum sulphate, we may not have a duty to warn. The
authors of the restatement used the example of the steel masted sailboat that, because of
new usage of the waterway, has a capacity to run into overhead high tension wires.
Certainly, we ought to consider this a material risk, and you also have a great gravity of
harm should it occur.
As a torts professor, I wanted to figure out whether this new approach taken by the
reporters could be reconciled with the way I have taught torts. Of course, if it is not, I will
not confess to it up here. But what we have done, which I think is characteristic in a lot
of torts courses, is to start off on the left hand side, with duty. Duty is owed to those
whom the eye of reasonable vigilance would perceive an unreasonable risk of harm
should the actor proceed with an absence of ordinary care. If the result is not too bizarre,
remote or extreme, we will see that with regard to the duty issue, on questions of
foreseeability of the risk the plaintiffs carry the day. Without this type of limitation, you
would have limitless liability. Activities would become uninsurable, and as Anderson v.
'
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. ~ us, you would not know what to take precautions
against. The duty part of the analysis is only part of the overall negligence evaluation, but
without it you cannot seriously weigh costs and benefits as you would not know what
costs to undertake. For these reasons, among others, even with the duty of foreseeable
harm to foreseeable plaintiffs, there is poor Mrs. Palsgraf"out there beyond the perimeter
of the duty. It is a know-or-should-have-known standard without which you cannot really
measure costs and benefits for the rationales that I have undertaken to describe briefly as
to the lack of a pragmatic opportunity to create safety incentives without them. Thank
you.
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